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EXISTING IN A WORLD OF INSTITUTIONALIZED DANGER*
Progress was a good thing once,




Ve live in a world of institutionalized danger. Our
world has Increasingly become beset with critical problems de-
manding timely and effective resolution; however, as the num-
ber and intensity of these problems have increased, procedures
and mechanisms to identify, assess, and interpret them have
either not kept apace or have become so overloaded that reso-
lution has not happened. In a world dominated by life-shaping
and life-impacting trends that have remained unexamined for so
long, we have become unable either to comprehend or cope with
them in productive ways. Ours is a world in permanent crisis,
a situation resulting In decisions affecting millions which
are routinely ignored or deferred--only to emerge later in
more pressing form, which are made by only a few individuals
under such pressure that thought and analysis scarcely occur,
or which are not made at all.
The prospects for international cooperation and the like-
lihood to reduce levels of tension and insecurity are dim and
increasingly uncertain. This grim assessment, including its
more apparent causes and implications, demands society's full-
est attention.
Various factors contributing to the assessment are
sketched out in the following according to their most distinc-
tive features of form and texture. The portrait that thus
emerges could not be captured in a single glimpse, for it is
still far too complex for ready comprehension. Six separate
illustrative areas of concern were, therefore, analyzed to ac-
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ments received from many colleagues, including Aaron Wildavsky,
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centuate specific Issues contributing to the whole. Summaries
describing each of the six partial views are presented and In-
terrelated to give one a sense of the confluence of features
and issues.
A separate section integrates the specific issues Just
noted by listing each topically and measuring It against a
series of operational questions. What is the issue's prior-
ity? How hard is it going to be to understand, answer, or re-
solve? Who is primarily responsible for the Issue's contribu-
tory factors? All such questions are meant to focus our atten-
tion in constructive ways, for it is far too easy to despair
about our dangerous world, while It Is Imperative that we con-
front that world solidly and with hope.
Many well established and critical trends exist in the
total context that are simply "invisible" to all but a few
specialists, are visible only if one is prepared to look at
the right time and place, or are plainly in view, but whose
future implications are not appreciated.
The overall perspective is necessarily a limited, high-
ly personal one. It stresses one from a multitude of alter-
natives and it is biased, having been refracted through a
unique set of lenses of experience, training, and concern.1
The six partial views and related topical issues are stark and
highly selective.
Limitations, biases, and shortcomings aside, the pur-
pose of this essay is to stimulate and bring to full atten-
tion many broadly stated ideas. A basic message is that hyper
and over-specialization have often caused us to lose sight of
the broad view and have contributed to our current condition
of out-of-control, institutionalized danger.
If. PRIMARY FEATURES OF THE CONTEXT
A. Population
The world's population in mid-1974 was estimated to be
3.89 billion, and was expected to reach 8 billion by the year
2010, some 35 years hence. Compared with a 1974 annual growth
rate of 1.9 percent, Africa and Latin America were growing at
1. In a nearly seven-year association with the research
program of The Rand Corporation, I have acquired many of the ex-
periences and most of the training shaping this essay. Among a
variety of technical reports and documents these matters began
to take shape; they are most explicitly drawn out in book-form
in The War Game: A Critique of Military Problem Solving, a joint
endeavor with my colleague Martin Shubik which is scheduled for
publication in late 1977.
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2.7 percent, Asia at 2.1 percent, Europe at 0.6 percent, and
China at 1.7 percent. The United States and the Soviet Union
were growing at 0.8 and 0.9 percent per year, respectively. 2
There is scarcely a world problem that does not stem at
least in part from a worldwide crisis of population growth.
B. Weapons
World spending on weapons had, by 1975, reached an an-
nual aggregate rate of nearly $300 billion, or slightly less
than $100 each year for every human being on the face of the
earth. The United States and the Soviet Union accounted for
60 percent of the world's military expenditures, but the coun-
tries least able to afford it registered the greatest per-
centage increases in arms spending in the 1960-1975 period.
Military spending more than doubled during the period, and the
Middle East led the way with an eightfold increase.3
The United States, beginning precipitately in about 1970,
became enmeshed in an escalating, out-of-control arms exporta-
tion spiral that by 1975 had reached an estimated $12 billion,
a sevenfold increase on the average from the five-year period
1965-1970, and an amount sufficiently large to make weapons
this nation's second largest class of exports--right after ag-
ricultural products. The U.S. Department of Defense arranges,
manages, and controls at least three-quarters of all weapons
traffic, and does so usually on a "government-to-government"
basis. While such exports contributed to a positive U.S. bal-
ance of payments position, increasing the opportunities for
scandalous conduct by arms manufacturers and "friendly allied"
buyers, and improving the likelihood and capability of many
others to kill and be killed, they actually diminished the na-
tional security of the United States in the near term by allow-
ing certain high priority items to be exported that were
needed to maintain minimal manning levels and equipment readi-
ness in U.S. military units around the world.
Besides the United States, Britain, France, and the
Soviet Union, Israel has recently joined in the rank of major
weapons exporters in a big way. Israel Aircraft Industries is
reportedly planning on selling upwards of $100 million worth
of its Kfir fighter aircraft, and the Peruvians and Venezuelans,
2. United Nations, Demographic Yearbook (1976).
3. R.L. Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures
(1976). Sivard was, until recently, an economist associated
with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The report,
it is commonly known, was originally prepared in 1972 under of-
ficial aegis. However, it was withheld by former Secretary of
Defense Laird on political grounds.
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among others, are the likely buyers.
The purchase of such weapons tends to aid inflation;
furthermore, it occurs at the expense of other kinds of pub-
lic needs. The price paid was most dear for the countries
least able to afford it. "Half of the world's school-age
children are not yet attending school; one-third of the adults
are illiterate. Governments spend two-thirds more for mili-
tary forces than for the health care of four billion people."4
The need for some sort of restraint seems long overdue.5
C. Europe as a Focus and Telltale
Basic contextual shifts in Europe have occurred and the
calculus of conflict has been altered there in many interesting
ways. With nuclear parity, Ostpolitik, and the emergence of
the Chinese superpower, many of the smaller, traditionally de-
pendent nations and ethnic groups have responded vigorously to
pursue claims long repressed out of fear or necessity. Such
acts are often conflictful and divisive.
At the national level, Turkey and Greece battled over
Cyprus within the shadows cast by the nuclear superpowers and
despite desperate U.S. negotiations and entreaties. Portugal's
turn to socialism and Italy's to its own brand of communism
both were probably not possible in pre-1975 European context.
At the ethnic level, the number and intensity of conflicts
appear to have jumped upward in recent years. During periods of
perceived, common threat, e.g., Cold War or crises, less stress-
ful elements in one's operational setting tend to be repressed.
With the reduction of such external threats, the individual's
focus of attention may contract, sharpen, and intensify on
localized issues. Such has occurred in Europe, and elsewhere,
in terms of the reemergence of traditional, ethnic differences:
Welsh, Scots, Basques, Irish, Bretons; Croats, Jura-Swiss, and
so forth. Couple detente (or other symbolic aphorisms indica-
tive of the contextual shifts toward nuclear parity) with eco-
nomic improvements having distributional differences which are
overlaid on ethnic, class, religious, or territorial ones and
the potential for conflict must increase, just as it has. °
4. Id. See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1976, at 1.
5. The dominance of weapons in current international
negotiations and dealings has reached such a point as to be cor-
rupting and grossly distorting. Sterile assertions that we must
provide weapons reflect gravely on the poverty of thought and
the dangerousness of the practice.
6. The phenomenon has taken hold around the world and
suggests that many powerless groups will turn to terrorism and
other weapons of the weak to pursue their claims, e.g., the
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D. The Soviet Union and Europe
The Soviet Union continues to suffer from a modified
form of national paranoia that has, with ample justification,
shaped that nation's international policies and attitudes.
The deeply embedded experiences of the post-revolutionary
Soviet leadership persist; however, an obvious point is that
by 1985 none of the leadership having memories of the revolu-
tion will remain, only a few who participated in World War II
will be around, and most control will reside with those whose
perspectives have been shaped by post-W.W. II experiences. If
the Soviet Union can survive the up-coming, significant change
in its leadership without resort to excessive internal dis-
ruption or without the emerging leadership's having to create
extravagant, unifying symbols of external danger, e.g., heat-
ing up the Chinese, German, or American "threat" as a diver-
sion from an internal transfer of power dilemma, then the
prospects for reaching some significant, not illusory, under-
standing with the Soviets may increase. The upcoming ten years
are going to be frightfully difficult--for the Soviets and for
the world.
Despite contradictory evidence, Angola most recently, a
long term and overall assessment of Soviet foreign relations
since World War II proves to be not much worse than our own.
Yugoslavia in 1948, Rumania in 1963, and Finland all have ob-
tained and/or maintained some measure of independence from the
Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia in 1968--and Hungary, Poland and
East Germany before that--were all severely repressed, but
each has since attained some relative measure of autonomy.
The Czech case is perhaps the least clear of this set, but
even in this juncture, one could argue that their 1968 tragedy
served to consolidate Brezhnev's power, without which there
would probably have never been a 1971 Berlin Agreement,
Ostpolitik, or any of the lesser agreements that, taken to-
gether, have been labeled detente.
II. TRENDS IN U.S. STRATEGIC POLICIES
The institutionalization of danger has not just happened,
but has developed over a period of years, as can be recalled by
summarizing the shifts and starts of U.S. strategic policies In
the last fifteen years or so.
Ainus, to cite only a recent, unexpected example, bombed a
tourist spa in Sapporo in Northern Japan. Though Polish-Amer-
icans and other hyphenated"Americans have noticeably asserted
themselves lately, the exte: !t-of their deprivational differences
has not been so great as to provoke more extreme behaviors.
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A. A Survey: 1962-1975
The clear strategic superiority held by the U.S. in
1962 was down played by defense planners as they portrayed
the threat of a large Soviet intercontinental ballistic mis-
siTe (ICBM) force as being just over the horizon, or in any
event, only a year or two away. (It was more than ten years
away.) The basic U.S. strategic mission was to deter war by
maintaining a capacity for the destruction of the enemy's war-
making capability. Civil defense was a live public issue.
Hence, at the beginning of 1962, our strategic policies are
best seen as a mix of Assured Destruction (AD) and Damage
Limitation (DL).
In 1963, AD received more emphasis. We were to achieve
deterrence by not only being able to destroy the enemy's stra-
tegic nuclear forces and other military targets ("counterforce"
in the jargon), but also by being able to destroy his urban
population, if necessary ("countervalue"). A second-strike
force was built to enhance our AD capability, and a protected
force was to be employed or held in reserve for the second
task. These discussions were carried out during the "Golden
Age of Systems Analysis." A rereading of practically any docu-
ment advocating the specific weapons intended to accomplish
these missions is startling, e.g., bald assertions of the de-
structiveness inherent in each system for each dollar expended;
incredible presumptions about the costs of building, operating,
and maintaining any of these systems; and blatant assumptions
about imagined conflict, which altogether amounted always to a
"worst case analysis" mentality. Worst case analyses are where
the enemy threat is overplayed and our current capability to
contain that threat is never fully disclosed, except in terms
of the future when a proposed weapon system x would be imple-
mented in all of its glory.7
By 1964, U.S. policy shifted dramatically. Our retal-
iatory forces now had to be able to destroy the Soviet society
fully, under all conceivable conditions--and to be visibly able
to do so. Plus, these same forces should be able to limit de-
struction to our own cities. However, virtually all discussion
7. No one has ever done a retrospective and comprehen-
sive examination of the quality and uses of military analyses
in the last decade or so. However, such would be a most in-
structive and revealing endeavor, were it done authoritatively
and well. A rare instance, for one particular analysis, is
T.A. Brown & E.W. Paxson, A Retrospective Look at Some Strategy_
and Force Evaluation Games (Santa Monica, Cal.: The Rand Cor-
poration, R-1619, September 1975), from which several of the
ideas in this section were derived.
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and cash were devoted to strengthening AD, and DL was rele-
gated to an occasional rhetorical flourish.
In 1965, the concept of Assured Destruction, around
which three or four years of thinking, planning, and spend-
ing had been devoted, was for the first time defined. AD
meant that one-fourth to one-third of the Soviet population
would be killed, and two-thirds of the Soviet industrial
capacity would be destroyed. Once defense analysts were con-
fident about being able to attain AD, as defined it meant
killing 50 to 60 million Soviets, then whatever resources
were left would go to Damage Limitation (DL) efforts. Civil
Defense funding at levels ranging from $5 billion to $25
billion were routinely discussed in public accounts, but
actual expenditures for this were about $150 million in 1965.
Anti-ballistic missile (ABM) planning, development, and test-
ing began in earnest.
In 1966 strong resource pressures to conduct a conven-
tional war in Vietnam limited the concept of AD as a rationale,
in the sense that it had been nearly achieved and the marginal
return for added AD investment was diminishing. We were run-
ning out of Soviet cities to target. However, confusion about
DL measures, and the likely Soviet response to them, reigned,
and civil defense was quietly dropped, even as a rhetorical
issue. However, ABM continued and grew in importance.
By 1967, AD was redefined. Now only one-fifth to one-
fourth of the Soviet population and one-half to two-thirds of
the industrial capacity had to be obliterated to assure destruc-
tion. DL was set aside, in fact, with a commonly stated argu-
ment that U.S. attempts to increase DL would only encourage
the Soviets to increase their attack forces, and conversely.
The logic seems acceptable enough, but one wonders why it was
not applied to AD as well. Anti-ballistic missile deployment,
by then advanced to a stage of large cash outlays for Safe-
guard and Sentinel systems, was seen to be mutually disadvan-
tageous, but an institutional inertia had taken hold that even-
tually led to the full implementation of one U.S. site by 1975.
AD remained the mainstay of deterrence in 1968. All pre-
text to DL was removed, it was judged not to be effective; how-
ever, if the Soviets were to continue with their ABM, then we
had to follow suit, despite the argument posed as early as 1967,
noted above.
In Defense Secretary Clifford's 1969 budget message to
Congress, it is clear that the U.S. would continue to have a
qualitative lead and a solid superiority in both the number and
overall combat effectiveness of strategic weapons. AD was the
only aspect of deterrence; no mention was made of DL. Safe-
guard ABM deployment continued, however.
A predominant assumption of strategic thinking in the
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late 1960s and early 1970s was that of "coercion." We must
maintain sufficient strength that we could coerce an enemy,
either to avoid initiating a nuclear war or, failing that,
sufficient strength to coerce an enemy into cessation. How-
ever, no one ever bothered to define coercion and no one ever
thought about what would be needed to produce cessation.
Secretary Laird reflected a shift in thinking in 1970 and ra-
tionalized ABM deployment as a means to protect U.S. cities
against the Chinese ICBM threat or to defend Minuteman ICBM
silos against an improving Soviet first-strike capability.
Out of this diffuse thinking about our strategic policy
came the notion of "sufficiency" in 1971, by which was meant a
maintenance of forces sufficient to prevent the U.S. and its
allies from being coerced. Sufficiency merely added to the
previous confusion by making such objectives even more obscure.
Replacing the AD concept, it was now inconsistent with the suf-
ficiency concept to plan strategic forces solely on some finite,
theoretical, capacity to infl ct casual itles presumed to be un-
acceptable to the other side.0 However, what was sufficient was
left sufficiently vague enough to allow it to mean just about
anything the weapons planners and builders wanted it to mean.
Wedding sufficiency to the concept of coercion did little to
clarify operational objectives or procedures either.
The Nixon era came to full strategic flower with the
concept of "flexible strategic options." No Chief Executive,
so it was argued, should be left with only one strategic course
of action, the mass destruction of enemy civilians and indus-
trial facilities. Hence in recent years, we have seen efforts
to create LSOs and LNOs, limited strategic and limited nuclear
options, respectively. As with AD, DL, sufficiency, and coer-
cion before, one does not know exactly what these concepts mean
• . except more of the same for weapons development and con-
tinued opacity on the policy side.
The so-called "posture statement" delivered in 1976 by
then-Secretary Rumsfeld coined the term "Assured Retaliation"
to describe our newest strategic concept. It means that we
will maintain an assured second strike capability and plan for
multiple limited strategic and nuclear options short of a first
8. It is remarkable how precise are our calculations in
areas where no one has experience, such as nuclear war, and how
guarded and qualified these same calculations become as we in
fact do have data, such as conventional war. The arrogance of
strategic calculators of the 1965-1975 era is quite like that of
the freshman algebra student who tailors his problems to the
few tools he has at his disposal and presumes that all problems
are thereby solved. It, like much strategic enumeration, is a
fool's wisdom.
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strike that will enable us to maintain strategic flexibility.
Not one single word in the posture statement is devoted to the
topic of assured destruction, for the first time in over twelve
years. However, no one has yet to define a limited strategic
option. What is it? What is going to be done, by whom? The
bomber force has been emphasized in military discussion of LSOs,
and some replanning of bomber missions has occurred as a re-
sponse to the demand that we have options, but even here one
must ask whether the concept is receiving little more than cos-
metic modifications from the earlier efforts to assure destruc-
tion. Who is to initiate a limited option? Who is to carry it
out? What is the purpose for such a conflict? These simple
questions continuously arise, but no answers are given by its
advocates.
Assured Retaliation also requires more thoughtful atten-
tion than it has been given to date. One must assume that such
an idea means that the Soviets are expected to launch a first
strike; otherwise, what are we going to retaliate against? How-
ever, the Soviet Union has bent extraordinary efforts in the
last few years to protect its citizenry through civil defense
(twenty or more million persons participated in such drills in
the summer of 1975). Were the Soviets to take the first step,
one must assume that their citizens would be as protected as
possible, and, if so, what are we going to retaliate against?
The FY 1977 military budget will probably exceed $120
billion, depending on last minute add-ons demanded by the
Executive Branch. Looming large on the horizon is anoth-er
destructive round of Navy and Air Force propaganda assaults
reminiscent of the late 1950s and early 1960s. The Navy wants
desperately to produce Trident submarines in numbers, and the
Air Force sees this to be counter to its desires for the B-I
and MX ICBM programs. Budget debates in the late 1970s will
likely be filled with lurid claims and counter claims about
this "threat" and that "capability," but claims whose strate-
gic conceptual content remains unexamined and beclouded by
the heat of partisan debate.
Coupled with the quest for LNOs and LSOs and for more of
the same big weapon systems are efforts to reduce strategic
arms through mutual agreements, or strategic arms limitation
talks (SALT). There is a serious "Catch 22" to SALT, however,
which has only reinforced many of the old and destructive in-
stitutional impulses.
B. SALT: Bargaining Chips, Pot Limit Poker; and Strategic
Policy in the Next Decade
Recent appeals from administration officials for increased
strategic spending pose this anomalous argument: We must spend
more dollars for various "bargaining chips," to be tossed on the
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negotiating table to enable a SALT talk to be successful, and
we must also spend more dollars, should these talks fail. Win
or lose, attempts to limit strategic arms through negotiation
are only adding to the number and potential destructiveness of
the respective arsenals.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld argued that the Soviets
will threaten our Minuteman ICBMs with a large force of high-
yield, accurate, and MIRVed missiles. The conclusion of this
argument usually follows that we must replace our current mis-
sile fleet with the new MX series, at an estimated cost of be-
tween $20 and $30 billion. His predecessor, it needs be noted,
consistently argued that this was infeasible. Our entire Min-
uteman force could not be knocked out by a Soviet first strike
because of unreliability, uncertain accuracy, and readiness
fluctuations; in other words, this kind of operation would al-
ways present an unacceptably high risk.9 Furthermore, the
triad of bombers, submarines, and missiles would be secure as
a total deterrent system, no matter how vulnerable the mis-
siles became.
The "heads we lose, tails they win" logic of current
policy arguments can be seen clearly in the following terms.
At Vladivostok in 1974, a ceiling of 1,320 MIRVed missiles was
set for both the U.S. and the Soviets. The Soviets did not
then have such a missile force, but when they do, they will in
theory have adequate warheads to threaten Minuteman. One can
only conclude that the ceiling was reached mainly to keep clear
of on-going Pentagon programs, not to limit or reduce strate-
gic arms. SALT will have no effect on the B-I bomber, selling
at three for a billion, the MX, at $20 to $30 billion for a
set, or the Trident missile carrying submarine, whose costs
vary widely depending on who negotiates with whom, and when
the negotiation takes place. At the moment, all of these and
several lesser programs represent an increase, at the margin,
in strategic spending for research and development alone from
the FY 1976 level of $7.3 billion to a reported FY 1977 budget
of $9.4 billion.
A major longer-term and serious current flaw in strate-
gic thought can be succinctly summarized as follows:
o A fifteen to twenty year preoccupation with the
ideology of Assured Destruction, specifically its
conceptualization and operationalization in suc-
ceeding generations of weapons, has led to the
9. The venerable idea of "calculated risk" enters at
this point. Often loosely and confidently used in practice,
one never encounters the calculations themselves. What is
risk? How does one calculate the same?
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development of a large, out-of-control vio-
lence system or institution.
Damage Limitation impulses have never been
well cultivated over the years, and in any
event have always been secondary in importance,
attention, and budget to those related to stra-
tegic destruction.
To appease those responsible for the violence
institution, by allowing them to produce and
deploy new weapons year after year, those in-
terested in strategic arms limitation have had
to resort to the use of "bargaining chips,"
i.e., press development of weapon x (which the
violence specialists were going to build any-
way) so as to have a chip to play in the next
hand of strategic, pot limit poker. In the
process, however, no one ever seems to have
asked the name of the poker game, but it is
beginning to look distinctly like a nuclear
version of "show down," called "murder-
suicide."
Hence, we spend more dollars for new weapons
to insure success in strategic arms limita-
tion negotiations, and we also spend more dol-
lars as a hedge against failure in those nego-
tiations.
This flaw must be examined and corrected, and the longer term
policy responsible for it and the violence institution must be
reexamined and changed.
The greatest potential threat to international peace and
a major source of rapidly deteriorating levels of individual
and collective security is an institution of our own making.
IV. THE CONDITIONS FOR INSECURITY
A. A World of Institutionalized Danger
Violence specialists throughout the world appear to have
gained a strong upper hand, and nowhere is this more remarkable
than in the United States and the Soviet Union. An ideology of
win appears to have overpowered clear thinking and fueled the
cancerous development of violence institutions both here and
abroad. Sadly, few have stopped to think enough or ask loudly
or often enough what game it is that we are trying so desperate-
ly to win. It looks distressingly like murder-suicide and the
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opportunities to fold in one's hand so as to play some other
game diminish as the stakes continue to build.
The technological dimension has become so large that
responsibility for weapons has devolved through time to many
different skill and managerial specialists. This devolution
carries with it high costs. While a technical specialist may
move competently, such individuals seldom show concern for the
direction of that movement. Furthermore, with the prolifera-
tion of technical skill groups, there is attendant diversifica-
tion of outlook, preference, and .loyalty. Morale and social
cohesion become strong issues, and the requirements to main-
tain each is met, increasingly in our modern societies, by
sophisticated propaganda--or symbol manipulation.
The depiction In Figure 1 accentuates this point to









Fig. ]--The Violence System
The "win ideology" embedded in our strategic thinking
has created strong institutions devoted to the production of
war-waging and nuclear energy products, either category of
which could be further subdivided into its constituent, spe-
cialized products. The creation of such products has in turn
been further stimulated by the manipulation of symbols or
propaganda whose basic function has served to reinforce the
need for more specialization and greater development of the
Institutions akd systems responsible for the products. The
total system has been stimulated by an ideology whose main com-
ponents are not logically consistent and whose premises and
initial rationalizations have too long been unexamined. The
system itself is sustained and grows through a positive feed-
back of propaganda.l0
There are several points which may need investigation
and change: Reexamination of the ideology from many different
10. See J. Ellul's brilliant and worrisome Propaganda
(K. Kellen & J. Lerner, trans. 1973 ed.).
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points of view; analysis of the full extent of the institu-
tions and systems of violence; review of the products for what
they are; and measures taken to redirect their institutional
bases to other pursuits. Currently we have "capabilities in
search of threats," and threats in search of capabilities."
Either way, it makes the violence system self-sustaining. Ra-
ther, the propaganda feeding the enlargement of the producing
institutions needs to be altered, tempered, and mediated.
For instance, one concrete form taken by this propaganda
is the absolute dominance of research and development (R&D)
thinking and funding by several instrumentalities of the De-
partment of Defense. Were the Office of the Director of De-
fense Research and Engineering]1 and the Defense Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency, to name two obvious arms of the sys-
tem, to have their considerable funding removed and placed un-
der the control of the National Science Board, then perhaps the
narrow and self-amplifying feedback loop would significantly
change and hence so, too, would the institutions and systems.
If the information contained in the two feedback loops were sub-
jected to open investigation and debate, as happened with the
anti-ballistic missile system in the early 1970s, then per-
haps the adjustment and modification of the system might take
place. 12 The following six separate pictures illustrate what
the violence system has engendered.
B. Six Pictures of Institutionalized Danger
The first picture concentrates on proliferation and the
use of nuclear weapons and does so from the perspective of
possible conflict in the Middle East. This is consistent with
past patterns of instability in that troubled area and with re-
cent, huge increases in the procurement of weapons and nuclear
capabi lities.
1. The Shah and the Bomb
Iran has embarked on an amazing program of nuclear energy
development. Twenty, one-thousand megawatt reactors have been
programmed to be in operation by the end of the 1980s. These
reactors will be producing sufficient plutonium to build hundreds
of bombs each year. The total energy consumption of Iran in 1975
11. The Director in 1975 was brought to task for consort-
ing with defense contractors at a Caribbean retreat. He has
since taken a position with one of the largest defense firms.
12. Operations Research, Vol. 19 (Sept. 1971).
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
was only 14,000 megawatts. 13
Iran is also planning to buy plutonium reprocessing
facilities, ostensibly to prepare fuel for the next genera-
tion of reactors. Not normally noted, however, is the fact
that such reprocessing facilities are equally capable of pro-
ducing weapons-grade materials. The Shah will be able to
build and deliver his own nuclear weapons by 1982, according
to the present schedule. This great leap into the nuclear age
has been aided by the hiring of the head of Argentina's nu-
clear program and many of his technical associates. Iran's
grave political instability in the past years facilitated
that move.
The basic problem is petrodollars. Lacking sufficient
domestic incentives for productive investment of these wind-
fall resources, the Shah has embarked on an ambitious and po-
tentially devastating program of nuclear energy development.
Uranium reactors represent an easy way for nations such as
Iran to make an otherwise impossible "great leap forward."
The need for the developed nations to provide alternative,
safe investment opportunities to absorb these funds, in other
than nuclear and war-waging products, is striking. Nuclear
reactors are commonly regarded as an interim step in the ul-
timate development of peaceful energy sources. We must in-
sure that the interim is as brief as possible to avoid un-
necessary and dangerous proliferation of nuclear plants. The
need for the developed nations to create and deploy the next
generations of energy sources as a substitute for the nuclear
option could not be more pressing.
Developing a nuclear reactor capability needs to train
technicians to man and operate these reactors. For Iran, and
other nations, this step has been facilitated through the em-
ployment of skilled foreign technicians and through the crash
training of their own domestic technicians. The development
of the reactors themselves has been facilitated by the pur-
chase of French and German technical talent and by contracting
for "turnkey projects," i.e., reactors that are complete and
ready to run at the turn of a key. In the Iranian case, there
are about five to six years left before the "turnkey" reactors
will be on-line, producing power and plutonium. For those who
doubt that an underdeveloped nation can train an adequate num-
ber or quality of nuclear technicians, one needs only refer to
the Indian case and the recent explosion of that country's own
nuclear weapon: euphemistically referred to as a "peaceful
13. I am indebted to George Quester, a former colleague
at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, for
sharing his concerns, which he develops and enlarges in "The
Shah and the Bomb," 8 Policy Sciences 21 (1977).
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nuclear explosion," or PNE.
14
Institutional controls seem to exist, but these are flim-
sy at best. A Middle East Nuclear Free Zone has been proposed,
but its Latin American counterpart indicates that such an ex-
ercise is empty, containing the "peaceful nuclear explosives"
loophole. Brazil, thought to be on the verge of producing its
own weapon, has resisted even this small gesture toward con-
trol and restraint. The International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) could be cited as a positive control over the misuse of
nuclear energy, but here too there are significant limitations.
IAEA has but 67 inspectors to cover some 469 nuclear sites world-
wide in 1976, and it has been estimated that there will be on
the order of 1000 such sites by 1980.15 The major discrepancy
In the actual operation of the IAEA is one related to propaganda
efforts, the lower feedback loop shown in Fig. 1. Two-thirds of
the IAEA budget is devoted to the promotion of nuclear energy,
mainly through its so-called "nuclear power planning study"
mechanism. Less than one-third of Its budget, or about $37
million in 1975, went to inspections and other regulatory ef-
forts. Promotional propaganda leads simply enough to prolifera-
tion, not to restraint.
Complicating the Iranian case and making the whole pic-
ture of the Shah and his bomb more ominous is the current state
of governance in that nation. The Shah runs the country. There
is little or no governmental infrastructure. An accident, such
as an assassination, would be disastrous for stability in Iran
and would present increasingly grave danger to the world as
Iran's nuclear reactors come on-line. This potential instabil-
ity is reinforced by American desires, stemming from the "win
ideology," to use Iran as a buffer and counter to the Soviet
Union in that particular area of the world. In a passion to as-
sure that the Soviet Union can be destroyed, indirectly through
a strong Iranian ally, the United States has ignored the poten-
tial inherent in the nuclear reactors that the Shah has so vigor-
ously sought. Moreover, the United States has provided him with
an impressive nuclear delivery gapability as well in the form of
the "Tomcat" fighter aircraft.]6  In this case, there is a syner-
14. The Arms Control Report (U.S. Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency, Publication 89, July 1976), is instructive on
these and related issues,
15, Walske, "Nuclear Electric Power and the Prolifera-
tion of the Nuclear Weapon States," I Int'l Security 94 (1977).
16, In an unattributed interview, one formerly high-
ranking defense official noted that Iran would never be able to
counter a determined Soviet advance in the Middle East; however,
with nuclear weapons, "the Shah could probably rip off a Soviet
arm or a leg." This individual was unconcerned about the Shah's
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gistic effect between U.S. desire to produce and sell weapons,
a nuclear reactor capability, and U.S. ideological thrusts in
the murder-suicide game. The sum of all these factors has not
been adequately considered.
Several more hopeful signs exist worldwide, however.
South Korea has recently been denied a similar nuclear
reprocessing capability through the quiet acquiescence of the
French and the resultant cancellation by the Koreans of their
reprocessing facility. West Germany, however, continues to
plan for the delivery of such a plant to the Brazilians, and
the French continue (despite demurrals) to promote their tech-
nological prowess in this field to the Pakistanis. Neither
Brazil nor Pakistan has signed any non-proliferation treaty.
What is needed, besides the specific proposals noted for
the Iranian case, are regional, multi-national fuel recycling
centers to meet the world's near-term energy needs safely.
Also needed are more detailed, open, and scientifically in-
formed inquiries into the likely implications and future de-
velopments of apparently "safe" technologies, such as those
carried out in Sweden but in few other places.17
2. Big Power Accident: Communications, Command and Control
For a number of complex reasons, there is growing real-
ization that the war-waging capabilities of the United States
and other nuclear nations may not be as subject to political
control as they should be. The heart of any large-scale and
far-flung defense system is communications, but the present
state of the United States' military communications system,
and hence its controlling links to the weapons of mass destruc-
tion, is poor. Not only are command and control of weapons
questionable, but we know very little about end-of-war bargain-
ing and negotiations, in theory, structure, or process. Both
of these issues become obvious by simply asking the following
question: Were a nuclear weapon to be used, no matter what
the reason or who initiated the use, would the involved parties
impending bomb-producing capability, and was delighted about his
procurement of other weapons. Current sensational revelations
about the acquisition of the F-14, "Tomcat" only reinforce our
concern.
17. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
Safeguards Against Nuclear Proliferation (1975); and idem, World
Armaments and Disarmament (1975), for a collection of thoughtful
essays on this topic. Professional societies, worldwide, have an
unrealized responsibility to perform this forecasting and apprais-
al function.
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be able to terminate the conflict even if they wanted to? Both
technical and socio-political information necessary to answer
the question are in critically short supply.
At the moment, military commanders rely on commercial
cable, satellite channels, and two unreliable parts of what
should have been a military global satellite system. About two-
thirds of all international military message traffic currently
flows over commercial communications facilities--one-third over
cable and one-third over satellites. The Defense Department
leases about 200 commercial channels, and the current cost for
this for the three year period, 1975-1977, totals about $1.2
billion. A prime question is why the commercial operations are
able, technically, to maintain reliable service and why the
military is not. This is not to say that there is no attention
and money being spent on these matters, e.g., the NAVSTAR global
positioning system, which will in theory yield positional in-
formation that will enable bombers, missiles, and ships to de-
termine where they are to within 30 feet of true location, is
being pressed into service at an estimated cost of at least $1
billion. It is to say that the delays and cost overruns in
building a reliable communications system continue and the pos-
sible loss of command and control over the weapons of war grows.1 8
The issue of war termination has not received a fraction
of the time and attention it deserves. 19 The existing litera-
ture emphasizes the problem of communicating the willingness to
terminate and the terms for negotiating an end to armed conflict.
Ambiguity, misperception, and distrust in termination communi-
cations have all been noted at one time or another in this re-
gard. The problem of coordinating military and diplomatic ac-
tions during war is exacerbated by an unwillingness or simple
failure of the political leadership to engage in "peace planning,"
the relationship of military strategies with diplomatic-termina-
tion strategies. Typically, peace planning has been avoided,
and when wars near conclusion, evidence of coordination between
military and diplomatic initiatives is usually absent. 20 We have,
18. These problems have been well known within the mili-
tary community for some time. Open discussion of them has sur-
faced occasionally in Aviation Week, and even U.S. News & World
Report (Mar. 8, 1976), at 89-91, picked up on the issue.
19. F. Ikle, Every War Must End (1971), is z modest, his-
torically derived account. But cf. Foster & Brewer, "And the
Clocks Were Striking Thirteen: The Termination of War," 7 Policy
Sciences 225 (1976).
20. Besides deficient pre-planning, several other condi-
tions normally exist that impede rapid termination of wars:
domestic political concerns, cries of "treason," and loss of con-
trol of war-making to the military have all, at various times,
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in our strategic thinking and force deployment, come to ex-
pect that the military will be responsive to politically Im-
posed constraints on action and to expect that the political
leadership will be able to monitor the battle situation and
to communicate those constraints as the situation changes.
Such expectations require close examination in the nuclear,
as opposed to conventional or limited, warfare setting.
In the limited, conventional war context, there is ade-
quate time to formulate and negotiate termination conditions
before the military eliminates either side's capability to
continue or wrecks unacceptable damage on the combatant's
civilian populace. In the nuclear context, the time element
is greatly diminished while the destructive potential in-
creases drastically. Time is not measured in years or months,
but rather in minutes or seconds. Potential destructiveness
is not measured In tens or hundreds of casualties sustained
over lengthy periods of time, but rather in terms of thou-
sands or millions of deaths inflicted in moments.
Nuclear war is likely to end in ultimate destruction
before anyone has time to consider why there was a war in the
first place, let alone what would constitute grounds for its
limitation or end.
Deterrence thinking and the 'Vin ideology" have provided
little indication that the nuclear powers would be restrained.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union have emphasized
unlimited, spasm strategic attacks in the event of nuclear war,
e.g., Assured Destruction, Assured Retaliation. However, no
nuclear "rules of the game" exist by which the purposes and in-
tentions of either side might be communicated by a combination
of words and military actions. Though strategic thinking has
emphasized limiting escalatory incentives and ultimate destruc-
tion of warfare, it has not related war initiation and conduct
to a clear termination concept.
In advancing the Limited Nuclear Options concept, former
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger at least recognized this
problem, but he did not come to grips with it. Previous stra-
tegic thinking and doctrine, "neither contained a clear-cut
vision of how a nuclear war might end, or what role the strate-
gic forces would play in their termination."2 1 Limited options
as a concept has been endorsed by relating it to early termina-
tion: "To the extent that we have selective response options
. . we may be able to bring all but the largest nuclear con-
been prominent. For a review of the literature, see Wallace
Theis, "Searching for Peace: Vietnam and the Question of How
Wars End," 7 Polity, 305 (1975).
21. J. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department Report
(1974), at 36.
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flicts to a rapid conclusion before cities are struck.",2 2
Unfortunately, Schlesinger did not indicate how or why
a limited nuclear war could or should come to a "rapid conclu-
sion" any more than a limited conventional one. One must won-
der whether military limited options planners have a strategy
for bringing early termination, or, are they planning options
which, failing early termination, lead rapidly to an all-out at-
tack? Considering that the institutions responsible for this
planning have traditionally prepared for all-out attacks and
lacking any clear concept of war termination, the latter possi-
bility seems more likely.
Few well established and rehearsed procedural rules ex-
ist to guide adversaries, should they wish to terminate an in-
progress nuclear war. Certainly no precedents exist. For in-
stance, should someone initiate a preemptive attack, there are
strong incentives for the first aggressive actions to be taken
against communications systems: the launch of anti-satellite
missiles meant to blind and degrade one's ability to detect
incoming missiles and bombers or the purposeful decapitation
of primary command centers so as to parry an expected counter-
thrust. However, a resort to perfidious scenarios is not neces-
sary to arrive at much the same uncomfortable situation with
respect to command over the war-making machinery and control of
the ultimate destruction inflicted on all parties.
Blinding, degradation, and the loss of control may occur
simply as a result of high altitude nuclear detonation; no one
really knows with sufficient confidence what the worldwide com-
munications implications of such an explosion would be. Should
communications between political leadership and military com-
mand posts be interrupted, responsibility for the conduct of
nuclear war transfers eventually to a number of dispersed mili-
tary command centers. What are the consequences? The military
personnel in charge, one can assume, are primarily motivated by
what one could call war-conduct incentives; they are responsible
primarily for carrying out large-scale, pre-planned strategic
retaliatory attacks to achieve the greatest possible military
destruction. Defining limited objectives, constraining opera-
tions to conform to such objectives, and negotiating war termi-
nation short of all-out attacks are not part of their training
or assigned responsibilities. Nor is it clear that the neces-
sary coordination and control of operations would be possible
in such a "headless" war.
The creaky military communications system being what it is
and considering all of these unexamined problems, one has the
bitterly ironic vision of a political leader trying to find a
dime and an undamaged telephone booth so that he might call a
22. Id. at 380.
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mountain command post to try to stop a nuclear war.23
3. Intentional Big Power
Popular thought allows that a direct attack by one nu-
clear power on another would be suicidal. This is, of course,
the keystone of deterrence thinking. However, little attention
has been devoted to a deceptive initial gambit as one means to
reduce or delay a suicidal, retaliatory response.
If a great power were to initiate nuclear war intention-
ally, it would probably be through a deceptive move. Alterna-
tively, were a great power to initiate a conventional, limited
war it would probably be as a result of a self-deceptive mis-
calculation of the risks inherent for doing so.
Deception has been a normal matter in the practical con-
duct of international affairs, but surprisingly little scholar-
ship exists related to the topic. Needed in this area is the
development of a base of information of those instances in In-
ternational affairs where deception has been employed. There
is some literature on this, but it is far from the mainstream
of scholarship and active concern and barely relates to opera-
tional doctrine or strategy.2 4 Having such information would
allow one to move on to the creative tasks of figuring out ways
to practice deception better, more effectively, and more effi-
ciently, and hence, figuring out what might be done to counter
the typical forms discerned in history. 2
Deception calls to mind the need for more and better In-
23. The celebrated blackout during 1976's first Presi-
dentipl debate contained an ominous message for us all.
24. R. Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision
(1962), is an excellent work, but it has failed to stimulate
much activity in this area, despite many research leads it con-
tains. See B. Whalley, Codeword BARBAROSSA (1973), for an ex-
cellent source of ideas and experiences on this topic.
B. Whalley, Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War (Center for
Int'l Stud., CIS-C/69-9, 1969), provides a veritable goldmine of
pertinent information.
25. This task has been begun and produced some inter-
esting preliminary results. See W. Harris, On Countering Stra-
tegic Deception (The Rand Corporation, R-1230, 1976). Besides
coining the clever label, "sprignals"--meaning "spurious signals"
--another interesting feature of both the Whalley and Harris
works is that they have been developed entirely with open, un-
classified, published sources.
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telligence studies and procedures.2 6 One would have to be
able to determine the source of a deceptive first strike as
rapidly and accurately as possible, e.g., was it a Soviet
weapon, a Chinese weapon, a terrorist's weapon? Miscalcula-
tion or misperception would be deadly. Hardened, deep-space
vehicles to aid in answering this question, placed under in-
ternational control for instance, would seem to be one in-
teresting option for consideration. However, Buck Rogers' ap-
peals for more technology are by themselves insufficient. One
should also examine current intelligence reporting procedures
from the point of view of securing information about intended
and actual deceptive moves as fast as possible. The current
situation, where floods of data, not hard information, routine-
ly inundate busy decisionmakers needs to be reappraised from
top to bottom. Communications could collapse under the strain
of time urgency in a nuclear, crisis context, even without the
added uncertainty of having sustained nuclear damage. In the
avalanche of priority messages directing this unit to go to
alert, or that unit to come into positions of highest readi-
ness., one would expect other messages meant to explain errors
and to correct oversights would be buried and left unread and
unexecuted.
Other intentional big power uses of nuclear weapons can
be imagined. For instance, the ground warfare that persists
along the Chinese-Soviet border could easily flare into a wider,
nuclear conflict. Were nuclear weapons, "tactical" probably,
to be used in this setting, how would one be able to know the
source and whether a claimed mistaken use was in fact a "mis-
take"? Were the Soviets to make the first move, what kinds of
controlled responses would be called for, by the Chinese? By
the United States? Might we provide the Chinese with a launch-
on-warning capability, tell the Soviets that we were doing so,
and then remove ourselves from the direct confrontation in
hopes that this minimal involvement would be sufficient to
stifle the next, dangerous moves?
The usability of nuclear weapons is built into them-
they have been designed and primed for ready use. Whether
through deliberate decision or for some other reason, the ac-
tual use of such weapons would result in a horror so great that
responsibility could not possibly be assigned to only a few men.
The blame would belong to the system that failed to avert the
horror. We need to reduce the danger inherent in the modern
engines of war, and such should be a topic for discussion in
26. See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, "The Intelligence
Function and World Public Order," 46 Temple L.Q. 365 (1973). See
also Colby, 'The Developing International Law on Gathering and
Sharing Security Intelligence," I Yale Stud. World Pub. Ord. 49
(1974).
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future arms limitation discussions. We should think through
methods and procedures to insure the "reversibility of
crises," for in the current situation a crisis is more likely
to work its way up, ratchet-like, to the use of nuclear wea-
pons, but it is not likely to wind its way back down with
equivalent ease. The Sino-Soviet situation calls attention
to the fact that international relations studies of the future
should focus on local sources of conflict that are likely to
lead to confrontation. What risks are inherent in changing
alliances? What is likely to follow from the Increased inter-
mingling of nuclear forces in distant oceans, on remote land
masses, and in space?
These issues have not been examined in sufficient de-
tail, and as long as nuclear weapons proliferate as they have
been, we must expect and be prepared for the fact that they
will be used, sometime, somewhere.
The problems of perception and signaling are funda-
mental in the international context, but we have not yet under-
taken enough systematic investigation of these topics to know
with certainty just how much or how little impact different
versions of the same situation will have on real world out-
comes. For example, what differences exist in terms of per-
ception, risk, and likely decisions that might be taken in var-
ious likely conflict situations? How can misperceptions and
miscalculations be spotted early enough that appropriate ac-
tions can be taken to avoid the resort to armed conflict?
These questions are not adequately considered in the current
literature or in current practice.2 7
The concept of flexible, limited strategic options car-
ries with it an increased burden that someone in authority
might be tempted to exercise one of these options, or that
there might be a mistaken use based on a "calculated risk" whose
implications are believed to be less than a call for an all-out
arsenal exchange. Flexibility, in this sense, represents an
enormous, unexamined threat of intentional use.
The impact of symmetry assumptions about force structure
and doctrine may carry with it the seeds of increased danger of
intentional big power initiation of either a conventional, lim-
ited conflict or of a first-strike nuclear one. In essence sym-
metry means that opposing forces are equivalently structured and
endowed. In the real world, as exemplified in discussions about
Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction in Europe, symmetry assump-
27. See R. Jervis, The Logic of Images in International
Relations (1970), for a thorough treatment of the general issue.
The relationship of risk taking behavior to perception is admir-
ably handled in F. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate(19 64). See also
R. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics
(1976).
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tions could very easily lead one to the erroneous conclusion
that equivalent reductions in forces would have approximately
equivalent effects on either side. Of course, this overlooks
the fact that a Soviet division removed from Poland only
travels across a border, while an American division removed
from West Germany ends up some 4000 miles from the scene. Sym-
metrically altering the status quo may only tip the delicate
calculation of risk enough to encourage one to initiate, in-
tentionally, a conventional conflict.
The impact of symmetry assumptions in SALT is reflected
in the fact that a Soviet missile or weapons system is not
equivalent to an American one, and crude "numbers games" match-
ing absolute amounts of missiles and warheads discloses very
little about either the weapons or their effectiveness.
We are stuck with symmetry largely as a result of our pre-
dominent ideology and because It is easier to think in simple
terms than complex ones. A simple assumption of symmetry in
the real world has led to the rather unimaginative tendency to
progress in lock-step fashion with one's imagined foe of the
moment; innovations, as achieved in research and development
by violence specialists, tend to focus on "keeping up" or "stay-
ing ahead" by making marginal adjustments to the current hard-
ware and forces and resisting basic changes in extant procedures,
tactics, strategy, and doctrine.28
The symmetry assumption persists, however, and currently
crops up and impedes constructive efforts to reduce the number
of nuclear'weapons deployed in NATO. It is publicly known that
there are on the order of 7300 nuclear weapons currently on alert
in NATO. These weapons present grave security problems, they are
expensive to maintain, and they are increasingly obsolescent.
Current discussions regarding the removal of at least 1,000 of
these weapons represent a step in the right direction for those
interested in reducing the levels of insecurity and tension and
the likelihood of nuclear use; however, symmetry has proved to
be a stumbling block to such reductions. Do 1,000 NATO nukes
mean the same thing as 1,000 Warsaw Pact nukes? Probably not,
but this is the current level and status of the debate.
28. A. Marshall, Problems of Estimating Military Power
(unpublished paper read at the Annual Meetings of the American
Political Science Association, 1966), emphasizes these issues.
"To continue to rely to any extent on the notion that [military]
organizations have a well-defined consistent set of objectives
which they seek to attain with fairly optimal expenditures of
resources given them by their governments is seriously in error."
at 22.
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4. Conventional War
One of the most disturbing developments in the interna-
tional context is the escalating, out-of-control arming of the
world with conventional weapons. Dramatic changes In conven-
tional military capabilities coupled with the facts of nuclear
parity and a lengthy worldwide recession all contribute to this
spiral.
Nuclear parity has reduced the credibility of reliance
on nuclear weapons for deterrence, and the rapid accumulation
of conventional capabilities by the less developed countries of
the world increases the chanoes for conflict. If we learned
nothing else from Vietnam, we should have realized that an
available means will lead to a search for ends to justify use
of those means. 29 Nuclear parity is effectively removing many
of the constraints that have for two decades Impeded worldwide
conventional arms competitions. As nuclear parity diminishes
the prudence and relative authority of the great powers, the
value of their security guarantees to clientele'states decreases.
The incentives for and potential instabilities in conventional
arms races increase accordingly. 30
Tied to these political, contextual factors is a revolu-
tion in conventional weapons capabilities. As Dr. Malcolm
Currie, former Director of Defense Research and Engineering, re-
marked, "A remarkable series of technical developments has
brought us to the threshold of what I believe will become a true
revolution in conventional warfare."3 1 The list of nearly simul-
taneous developments includes precision-guided anti-tank muni-
tions; precision-guided standoff aerial ordnance; accurate shoul-
der fired anti-tank weapons; mobile long-range, surface-to-air
missiles; and man-portable, precision guided air defense weapons.
The importance of these developments was forced to world atten-
tion during the late stages of Vietnam and most dramatically dur-
ing the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973. The full Implications
of these developments have not yet been adequately considered in
such areas as future conventional wars, the U.S.-Sovlet balance
29. A. Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment 119-33
(1971).
30. I have been enormously stimulated and enlightened by
my colleague, James L. Foster, who shared with me most of the
ideas and concerns developed in this section of the essay. See
Foster, "The Future of Conventional Arms Control" 8 Policy Science
1 (1977) for a more thorough, sophisticated accounting of these
issues.
31. "The Automated Battlefield," New York Times Magazine,
Feb. 23, 1975, at 12.
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in Europe,3 2 the distortion of economic priorities and infra-
structures in producer and consumer nations, and international
stability.
In general these developments have the following common
properties; They are cheap to develop, procure and operate;
they are small in size; they increase the firepower and lethal-
ity of minimally trained forces, including terrorists, guer-
rillas, and irregular forces; they are relatively easy to de-
velop and produce; there are few constraints to proliferation;
and even the largest of these weapons can be hidden or disguised
to look like something else.3 3
Lacking data and systematic analyses of the capabilities
of these new weapons, definitive assessments of their implita-
tions are difficult to make. However, the systems of institu-
tionalized violence are hard at work producing propaganda which
makes these weapons look very favorable to U.S. defense objec-
tives. Such assessments need to be examined, for they appear
to suffer from a number of basic limitations: They tend to
focus on the effectiveness of individual weapons in narrowly
contrived or simulated battlefield environments rather than on
their total realistic implications in peace and war; they over-
look the inevitable development of counter-measures; and they
tend to assume a one-sided possession of the new technologies.3 4
Such assessments furthermore mask over some of the more sub-
stantial effects these and other conventional weapons are hav-
Ing on the social fabric of the producer and consumer nations.
The United States is largely responsible for the out-of-
control escalation in arms worldwide and has been the source
of most of the new technological developments that have altered
the conduct of conventional war drastically. Since World War
II, it is estimated that over $100 billion worth of arms have
been exported to more than 136 states, more than the combined
arms sales of all the other states in the world. More than one
thousand U.S. companies are engaged in the production and legal
export of weapons. 35 This traffic has been steady over the years,
32. T. Cliffe, "Military Technology and the European Bal-
ance," Adelphi Papers, No. 89, International Institute for Stra-
tegic Studies kAugust 1972).
33. For example, the use of remotely piloted vehicles
cast out of a "commercial" Boeing 747, or its equivalent, would
present untold problems of identification should an enemy wish
to make a deceptive first strike. Foster, supra note 30, at 5-6.
34. James F. Digby, Precision-Guided Weapons (Santa Mon-
ica, Cal.: The Rand Corporation, P-5384, March 1975), is one
open source that indicates most of these issues in arguing for
wholesale development and deployment of the new technologies.
35. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1976, at 44, col. I.
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and prior to 1970, accounted for about $1.5 billion annually.
Since 1970-71, however, this level has risen sharply to the
point where in 1973 it accounted for $4.2 billion, in 1974
some $10,2 billion, and in 1975, more than $12 billion in
total exports. This increase has been stimulated by greed as
much or more than it has been by concern for international
security; it has been aided significantly with federal credits,
encouragement, and arrangements. The corrupting influence of
the large sums involved has only become evident in recent sen-
sational disclosures about Lockheed and other defense pro-
ducers. 36 The issue has been succinctly summarized In these
terms: "The short term health of a politically powerful seg-
ment of American industry has weighed more heavily in Wash-
ington's calculations than the destabilizing effects of huge
arsenals in far-flung areas of the world."37
A most depressing aspect of the current revolution and
escalation in conventional weapons is that the weapons appear
to have changed the nature and conduct of conventional war In
several fundamental ways. Generally one should come to expect
more frequent conflict of greater intensity, happening with
less forewarning, and resulting in greater losses of men and
material. These general outcomes follow when one analyzes the
likely specific implications of having and using these weapons:
They appear to result In increased incentives to build larger
conventional forces, requiring larger logistics and support
bases; they encourage surprise attack; and they induce speedy
campaigns having dramatically heightened, acceptable tolerance
levels for losses of men and material. At least these seem to
be the tentative conclusions of the Arab-Israeli, October 1973
encounter. There is little reason to disbelieve that these
36. This aspect of multinational corporations is noted
in Multinational Enterprises (J. Wilson & C. Schaeffer, eds.,
1974). This calls to attention an earlier comment made with
respect to the loyalties of diversified technical skill groups,
and the need for sophisticated propaganda to maintain some sem-
blance of social cohesion. To whom does a multinational owe
allegiance? What kinds of symbols sustain its existence?
37. N.Y. Times, supra note 35. Similar concern Is
finally being evidenced in France, which sold on the order of
$8 billion worth of arms in 1975. A prime rationalization
there has been that arms sales provide employment for French
workers, an important, domestic political result. The Arch-
bishop of Paris, Francois Cardinal Marty has noted that the
French "cannot resign ourselves to make money by putting dead-
ly weapons in the hands of others. The commerce of arms is
actually becoming an institution." N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1976,
at 8, col. 1.
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findings will also hold for any other conventional wars in the
future.
5. Unconventional Warfare
The world's population will double in 35 years at current
rates of population growth, and such a doubling will bring the
total number of mouths to feed to about 8 billion. The problem
is feeding twice as many people with a fixed amount of agricul-
tural resources.
At the moment, the United States is responsible for over
one-half of all the grain moving in international trade; the
value of this export resource amounted to $22 billion in 1975.
To date, food has been a constructive element in the conduct
of U.S. foreign policy: We have shared our harvest through
various aid programs to the tune of about $1 billion annually
over the last 20 years; over 80 percent of all relief food dis-
tributed worldwide has been of U.S. origin; and food has con-
tributed to relaxed U.S.-Soviet relations. What is likely to
happen in the future when surpluses are outstripped by the
worldwide demand for food? The future has lately been ominous-
ly alluded to by several politicians. Senator Herman Talmadge
reportedly told a gathering of Kansas farmers that "agri-
business means agri-power."38 The concept has been cropping
up more frequently than ever, and implicit in the concept is
a policy advocating the use of food as a coercive weapon. Food
is a weapon.39
There are other likely, but as yet unrealized, weapons
that might be employed in unconventional conflicts of the fu-
ture. Several of these have already appeared on the interna-
tional scene.
Oil was used against the developed nations by the oil
cartel in the early 1970s, and is likely to be used again as
the leadership of the Middle East is forced to play its main
trump cards to attain world stature and power. Other natural
resources have been similarly used, but with less success to
date, mainly because of substitutional effects and the ab-
sence of political cohesion and solidarity among those con-
trolling the resource in question. As certain natural re-
sources are exhausted, the coercive use of resources is likely
38. Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 23, 1976, at 32,
col. 4.
39. A closely related matter concerns the likely dis-
position of unwanted and unsupportable masses of humanity.
Sensitive scholarship, such as that undertaken in support of
inquiries into the Holocaust of World War Ii's death camps,
is desperately needed.
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to increase.
Technology has been used as a carrot in the past, and
will likely be used as a stick in the future. We have en-
tered into technological exchanges with the Soviets as a ges-
ture of our sincerity about detente. Point IV, Technical As-
sistance, in our foreign aid programs of the last 25 years was
a constructive use of technology to advance our own foreign
policy aims and to advance mankind. Television, "The Pill,"
credit institutions, fertilizer, nuclear technology, and the
most up-to-date weapons of war have all, at one time or another,
been used in this manner. Although such uses will continue
into the future, their use will become increasingly coercive
and competitive throughout the next decade or so, as uncon-
strained population growth places unimagined stresses and bur-
dens on social and political institutions around the world.
Two rather unexpected future forms of powerful instru-
mentalities might be credit and information. Credit and regu-
larized and civilized international monetary institutions have
never been so much in demand, nor has their absence been more
noticeable. Masses of windfall cash credits accumulate in one
sector of the world, but the existing institutions are unable
to relocate these assets to relieve the creditors of their bur-
den or to satisfy potential debtors' productive and basic human
requirements. Resort to wasteful arms and nuclear energy pur-
chases have too often been the short term and non-productive al-
ternative available to potential investors.
Information, In the form of early warning about natural
events or potentials, e.g., earthquakes, storms, crop blights
and failures, and untapped resource deposits; in the form of
processed information and analyses relating to resource use,
national planning, and communications; and in the form of moni-
toring and early warning about hostile advances on one's terri-
tory, all will contribute to International cooperation and sta-
bility, if treated wisely.
These instrumentalities have the potential for reducing
tension levels and increasing the prospects for international
cooperation. Nevertheless, because of its increasing value and
decreasing availability, each instrumentality also has the ter-
rible potential of becoming an object of conflict and hostility.
The chances of these commodities being used for peaceful and in-
tegrative--versus hostile and disintegrative--purposes, appear
to depend to a large extent on the world's ability to regain
control of its population. It is, for instance, important that
alternative food supplies be developed, such as the production
of Brazilian soy beans or Argentine grains; it would be insuf-
ficient, however, if these efforts were not accompanied by com-
mensurate and meaningful attempts to control population. The
tragedy of the "Green Revolution" only underscores the obvious:
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Better to have a population and hunger crisis with 4 billion
people than with 8 billion, for at the lower level the net
human suffering must be some significant amount less. To en-
courage fecundity by developing additional agricultural produc-
tivity may be a more heinous act than not working for increased
productivity at all.
6. Terrorism
In this decade, terrorism has grown from an esoteric as-
pect of aggression and violence to a predominant means for in-
ternational and intranational conflict resolution. 40 It ap-
pears likely that as the smaller nations and weaker specialized
interest groups of the world acquire the technology of modern
war, both conventional and nuclear, they will increasingly turn
to terrorism--just as the Palestine Liberation Army has done in
the Middle East, as the Irgun and Stern Gang previously did
against the British Empire, as guerrilla groups in various Latin
American countries do, and as the 19th Century eastern European
revolutionaries did in order to bring down autocratic govern-
ments. The justification of such miniscule terroristic groups
as the Weathermen, the Symbionese Liberation Army, and the
Revolutionary Army of America, to cite only three current ones
in America, is that the government exerts terror on its popula-
tion and that these groups are merely responding in kind. The
irony is that the formalization of the concept of terror came
from the governmentally imposed Terrorisme of post-revolutionary
France, mainly under Robespierre.
It is also ironic that terrorist groups are among the
first to exploit the interdependence of our lives in a planetary
community, rather than a conglomerate of national communities.
The consumption of irreplaceable elements by a relatively hand-
ful of the human race affects the lives of all members of the
race. Coupled with the knowledge that the great powers have
the ability to destroy both opponents of the moment and probably
all of human society, and one comes quickly to the few alterna-
tives that exist to resolve conflict,
A main alternative is terrorism. By this we mean, taking
a cue from Willrich, "threats or acts of violence planned, at-
tempted, or carried out by an individual or group with a spe-
cific political intent in mind." And in the case of interna-
40. Dr. Lawrence Z. Freedman of the University of Chi-
cago's Institute of Social and Behavioral Pathology has been ex-
tremely helpful in shaping the arguments and thoughts in this
section of the essay.
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
tional terrorism, the definition is expanded to include the
following condition: "such acts must fall outside the ac-
cepted norms of international diplomacy and rules of war."41
Terrorism as conventionally understood was the pre-
rogative of the powerless; 42 it was a technique whereby a few
determined men and women could affect the destinies of large
empires. This has changed. 3 Today the technique is used by
elements of virtually all societies: The CIA of the United
States and the comparable organizations of the Soviet Union
and China routinely carry out terroristic acts against feeble,
virtually preliterate, and almost entirely agricultural socie-
ties with as much abandon as they operate aga .nst one another
and the citizens of their respective nations. 4
In this global setting, terrorism has become the pre-
dominant form of confrontation between differing sub-components
of societies which seek to overcome each other, regardless of
size. Yet, there is no visible nuclear terrorist prevention
doctrine, nor is there an institutional focus for preventing
terrorism that is in any respect commensurate with that for
deterring nuclear war. If the likelihood of nuclear terrorism
is remote, it is not because anyone has made a concerted ef-
fort to prevent it. If nuclear terrorism, as only one impres-
sive form that this kind of activity might take, is rapidly be-
coming more practical and legitimate, then a need exists to ex-
amine the factors which determine the shape of terrorist pre-
vention policy and the efficacy of present safeguards programs.
We include not only safeguards in the nuclear power industry,
but also in the military nuclear programs as well. Other
things being equal, terrorists would likely challenge the
least reliable security system. To the extent that traditional
concerns of the military, i.e., producing and deploying weapons,
41. Willrich, "Terrorists Keep OutI" 31 The Bull. of the
Atomic Scientists 12 (1975). See also, B. Jenkins & J. Johnson,
International Terrorism (The Rand Corporation, R-1597, Mar, 1975;
Paust, "Terrorism and the International Law of War," 64 Mil. Rev.
1 (1974).
42. E. Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (1969), Is illustra-
tive of the out-dated view.
43. D.V. Segre and J.H. Adler, "The Ecology of Terrorism,'
40 Encounter 17(Feb. 1973); A. Burton, Urban Terrorism: Theory,
Practice, and Response (1975); and S. Hook, "The Ideology of Vio-
lence," 34 Encounter 26 (Apr. 1970).
44. J. Niezing, Urban Guerrilla: Studies on the Theory,
Strategy, and Practice of Political Violence in Modern Societies
(1974); and Yaari, "Al Fatah's Political Thinking," 11 NM Out-
look, 20 (Nov.-Dec. 1968).
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vie with terrorist prevention programs for attention and re-
sources, then one should expect the latter to be slighted.
Likewise, to the extent that the nuclear power industry's tra-
ditional concerns, i.e., promoting, producing and using nuclear
reactors, vie with the terrorist prevention programs, then one
should also expect the latter to be slighted.4 5 Both cases de-
scribe the current state of affairs.
The revolution in conventional arms is having an impact
on terrorism, and that impact has yet to be examined sufficient-
ly. New, small, cheap, and accurate weapons are ideal for ter-
rorists. Some governments support, train, and equip groups to
wage war against other governments and groups. Such "surrogate
warfare" is likely to increase. Smaller and smaller groups of
extremists and disaffecteds are acquiring more and more power
to disrupt and destroy. Governments are hard pressed to counter
them without resorting to numerous, oppressive restrictions and
affronts to the general citizenry. The emerging world Is be-
coming an unstable collection of nations, ministates, autonomous
ethnic substates, governments In exile, national liberation
fronts, guerrillas, and shadowy but destructive terrorist or-
ganizations. On an international scale we have not come to
realize this basic fact. 4
We do not know as much about all of this as we should.
We need, for instance, to consider the common structural fea-
tures of the act of terrorism: Audience, terrorist, victim,
media, spectator, authorities, allies, and sanctuaries. We
should also examine the separate phases of the terrorist act,
which include in the play of the game, preparation, execution,
climax, and denouement. Such a structural framework, or its
equivalent, could serve the very useful purposes of organizing
much of the existing, fragmented, case study literature on ter-
torism and of understanding terrorism's many forms and process-
es so that preventive and ameliorative policies and procedures
might be developed.47
45. M. Willrich & T. Taylor, Nuclear Theft: Risks and
Safeguards (1974), contains some absolutely chilling case mater-
ials and speculations on this topic. Blair & Brewer, "The Ter-
rorist Threat to World Nuclear Programs," J. Conflict Resolution,
September 1977 (forthcoming), focuses on Minuteman ICBMs in mak-
ing a case for heightened vigilance for both military and domes-
tic safeguards.
46. Brian Jenkins, High-Technology Terrorism and Surro-
gate War: The Impact of New Technology on Low-Level Violence
(The Rand Corporation, P-5339, Jan. 1975), is perhaps the only
published and available
47. One recent example of this literature is Micholus,
"Statistical Approaches to the Study of Terrorism" (Paper read
at the Conference on International Terrorism, Ralph Bunche In-
stitute of the City University of New York, June 9-11, 1976).
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V. TOPICAL ISSUES AND AN AGENDA FOR CONCERN; APPRAISAL AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
The six pictures of institutionalized danger just pre-
sented contain many pressing and unresolved questions. In
the following section several of these questions are summar-
ized, interrelated, and operationally identified as to who
might be most directly concerned with their resolution or
understanding.
Beginning with a listing of issues from each of the six
pictures, we conclude with a summary chart outlining productive
"'next steps."
A. Institutionalized Violence: General Comments
There is little doubt that the great powers have allowed
their own fears and desires for short term gain to overpower
any sensible conduct of longer term affairs in our dangerous
world. The violence system is out of control, and the world is
too tightly configured to allow it to run amok much longer.
It needs to be emphasized that the general thrust of this
essay explicitly includes all great power initiatives and activ-
ities. It is as necessary to be critical of our own delusions
as it is to be critical of those held by others In the Inter-
national arena. The mirror image and lock-step behavior of the
primary national interests in our dangerous world serve as the
basic foci and objects of study and attention in the following
suggestions and recommendations for change. The "win Ideology"
did not spring full-blown from the paranoid fantasies of any in-
dividual but rather is rooted in the dismal facts of present day
life.
Recognizing the self-amplifying nature of much current
propaganda (Fig. 1) provides one key to restoring system control.
Suggested by this view of the system's operations is a need to
train and educate specialists counter to those currently re-
sponsible for the violence system.
Increased self-monitoring of the world's status, with re-
spect to international cooperation and control, is the order of
the day, and this order might begin to be filled by encouraging
existing specialized bodies of professional experts to promul-
gate periodic reports about the world context reflective of their
own areas of competence and expertise. Regular review reports
from physics, chemistry, agriculture, demography, and weapons
technology would all serve as a periodic reminder of the current
status of knowledge in any of these important specialties and
would also alert the world's leadership to areas of likely or
impending conflict. Besides stressing a global perspective,
which is not presently done very well, each report would help
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advance more general knowledge in the areas treated.
The development of a global perspective might also be
encouraged through Initiatives to create and operate a world
university, research institutions devoted to global--as op-
posed to narrowly national and militaristically oriented topics,
and through the training of scholars and analysts to have a
future and global orientation, rather than narrower, limited
ones.
A more specific concern relates to the development of a
two-sided advocacy system, rather than the lopsided system
that currently dominates the flow of propaganda stimulating
the violence institution. The current process of conducting de-
fense weapons analyses provides an important illustration of
the clash between science and advocacy. There is need for open,
regular, and more rigorous review of the millions of dollars
worth of studies and analyses done annually by the Department
of Defense and its many clientele groups. In the last thirty
years, a multitude of consulting and advisory groups has sprung
up and has been used extensively by the Department of Defense
or by specific armed services. These groups have provided a
high level of professional analytic support for the Department
of Defense. Unfortunately, there is little countervailing tech-
nical power available to the Congress in situations where it be-
comes necessary to evaluate proposed Department of Defense ex-
penditures. 48
Needed is an independent "think tank" consulting group
which would provide legislators with the technical support
needed to judge the merits of complex budget requests. Inas-
much as the Department of Defense's budget requests are based
in large part on studies having a considerable technical com-
ponent, it would benefit the Congress, the Department of De-
fense, and ultimately the general public to have the technical
expertise available to obtain reasonably objective and inde-
pendent assessments of those requests.
This requirement should not actually be met with disap-
proval in the more thoughtful quarters of the military estab-
lishment, if the following comments from former General Glenn A.
Kent are in the least indicative of a growing awareness and
mood.49
[DIecisionmakers are becoming increasingly
annoyed that different analysts get quite
48. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has, in the
last year, begun to make modest inroads here. It is a com-
mendable, albeit insufficient, first-step.
49. Kent, "Decision-Making," 22 Air Univ. Rev. 62 (1971).
Kent speaks with authority, as he formerly headed all of the Air
Force's studies and analysis activities.
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different answers to the same problem.
[And] there must be something wrong when
quantification of some particular problem
produces such radically different results.
In a current situation of grave misgivings about any and
all arguments presented by the Defense Department, and the con-
sequent tendencies for elected representatives to reject these
arguments out of hand or to accept them on blind faith, the cre-
ation and active participation of such a countervailing techni-
cal analytic institution could Improve the quality of debate by
allowing "the facts" to emerge and be judged more on their merits
than is currently the case.
A good starting point for any professional institution-
building attempts designed to self-monitor and to create a two-
sided advocacy situation would be a thorough reexamination of
all U.S. and Soviet strategic policies, assumptions, plans, and
force configurations. This task has only been suggested in this
essay, but one would expect such a thorough reevaluation to be
as suggestive of old and lingering impediments to international
security as they would be of ways to begin their rectification.
In this same vein, a thorough, detailed evaluation of
all military studies and analyses produced over the last decade
would serve as a valuable socializing and learning experience
for the next generation of military and international analysts. 50
B. The Shah and the Bomb
Clearly needed are better methods and procedures of regu-
lation and control of nuclear reactor technologies and their
proliferation. International fuel recycling centers need to be
developed. Concerted and meaningful efforts to move on to the
next generation of power sources are imperative, so as to mini-
mize the interim period during which countries around the globe
feel compelled to resort to nuclear power. International mone-
tary and investment institutions, procedures, and practices need
to be examined and improvements implemented with greatest haste.
C, Accident
The likelihood of accidental nuclear war has never been
as grave, and our means for coping with such an eventuality have
never been so ill-conceived and poorly institutionalized. Com-
munication, command, and control of the war making machinery all
50. This might even help to counter the currently dis-
turbing reluctance of this nation's best minds and most talented
individuals to seek careers in these neglected areas.
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need to be reexamined with utmost care, but from the point of
view of terminating an in-progress nuclear conflict, not from
the current views of war initiation and conduct. These kinds
of inquiries would logically stress organizational, technical,
and procedural details, and should be taken from a comparative
perspective inclusive of all the great powers. Studies of per-
ception, threat, risk and negotiations are desperately needed
to inform such inquiries. Efforts must be bent to translate
current theories in these critical areas into operational terms.
The entire concept of limited strategic options has not been
critically discussed or reviewed, and the time seems ripe for
doing so.
D. Intentional
Serious investigations into deceptive practices from the
past in international affairs are needed to thwart future at-
tempts to use these or modern variants for illicit purposes.
Intelligence studies need to be openly carried out and their
operational recommendations implemented; such should, of course,
no longer be the sole responsibility of those to whom the in-
telligence function has been entrusted, considering their fla-
grant violation of that trust. Creative options to control or
bring to rapid conclusion regional conflicts must be imagined
and brought to full, international attention. Primary research
into the areas of perception, signaling, and negotiations is
needed and would likely relate well to efforts to control
regional conflicts. Likewise, basic examinations of old pre-
dispositions, embodied in current military doctrine, need to be
carried out, e.g., symmetry assumptions in nuclear and conven-
tional force posture and operational procedures.
E. Conventional
Every effort, public and private, is urgently needed to
deescalate the conventional arms race which has engulfed the
world. Besides regaining control of the technological resources
that stimulate and encourage this traffic, such as by removing
them from the various agencies of the Department of Defense and
placing them under the control of the National Science Board, it
might be useful to require the preparation of a 'W/ar Impact State-
ment" to be attached to any and all military spending bills in the
future. Such a statement could-be prepared by official agencies
of the government, such as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agen-
cy, or they could be prepared by professional societies and
groups. Sl Were this to exist, legislators would at least be
51. A "toothless" version of this prescription does in
fact exist. Because the requirement is levied on the violence
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forced to confront their own consciences before readily acceding
to the military's unrelenting demand for newer and better weapons,
Weapons capabilities analyses are needed to better understand the
full implication of the so-called "revolution" in conventional
arms. The world's best minds must come to grips with the basic
distortions that have been created in the industrial and social
fabrics of the arms producing nations: What alternative sources
of employment are possible, in the short and longer terms, to
keep these institutional resources productively employed while
at the same time reducing their contributions to world insecu-
rity? And finally, international monetary and credit institu-
tions must be designed and implemented to reduce Impulsive in-
vestments of national treasure in weapons and to induce other
more productive investments.
F. Unconventional
The population specter looms large when taken from the
point of view of likely, unconventional conflicts of the future.
Population issues lack a single frightening event that might
otherwise galvanize attention and action. Slow to develop,
they are also diffused and long-lived. Glacier-like, demograph-
ic pressure mounts slowly and massively. The pressure mounts
steadily but goes unnoticed until the impact of a long-
developing trend becomes evident in numerous places. At that
point, or so it seems, the sheer scale of the issue diverts
leaderships from effective action. The pressure mounts, and
with every passing day, constructive reaction to that pressure
becomes less likely.52 Focal areas of future unconventional
conflict, in which some positive steps might be taken before
it is too late, include agriculture, technology, depletable re-
sources, and information.
G. Terror
Basic research in abundance is needed to better under-
stand the causes and functional forms that terrorism has taken
and is likely to take in the future. If the picture presented
in this essay is even partly correct, the world of the next
decade will become an increasingly insecure one--personally
specialists themselves, the typical reports are more self-serving
than enlightening.
52. Peter Morrison, a demographer-col-league, has pointed
out the glacier analogy to me in conversation. It is a good one.
See his Demographic Trends that Will Shape Future Housing Demand
(Santa Monica, Cal.: The Rand Corporation, P-5596, February 1976)
for an example of his own professional work.
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and collectively, and terrorism will be a dominant form con-
tributing to this insecurity. Research tied to operational
initiatives in the nuclear pawer and weapons areas is called
for, as is similar work related to conventional arms and wea-
ponry.
VI . SUMMARY CHART
The foregoing discussion is summarized in Figure 2,
and concludes this essay. The reader is encouraged not to be
too disheartened, or at least not so disheartened that action
is inhibited. There is still time that most of these problems
could be confronted and dealt with, but that time is plainly
running very short indeed.
The chart is not filled in, and this is intentional.
My task has concluded for the moment, but the reader's has
just begun.
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